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Encrypted Memory Access by Peripheral Devices of a Confidential Virtual Machine
ABSTRACT
A confidential virtual machine (CVM) uses a hardware-rooted key to encrypt customer
data written to memory. For enhanced security, the CVM makes the plaintext-to-ciphertext map
depend on the physical address (PA) of the memory location. Peripheral devices operate not in
PA space but in input-output address space. Currently, peripherals can only perform memory
accesses without encryption, or need to use a two-pass, high-latency, power-intensive encryption
procedure involving a transport key distinct from the hardware-rooted key.
This disclosure describes techniques to enable a peripheral device of a confidential virtual
machine to access encrypted memory using a single encryption pass. The techniques enable
secure, high-speed computing at low power consumption. Address translation between inputoutput and physical address spaces is accounted for such that peripherals continue to work in
input-output address space while encryption continues to depend on the physical address of the
data. The techniques obviate compute-intensive transport keys subsidiary to hardware-rooted
virtual machine keys.
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BACKGROUND
Cloud computing services are provided by dividing compute resources into multiple
virtual machines that are provided to individual customers. A confidential virtual machine
(CVM) is a type of virtual machine that protects customer data by encrypting (decrypting)
customer data before writing to or reading from memory. The encryption key is rooted to
hardware, such that not even the cloud provider can extract customer data. Private data accessed
by a CVM is stored in a region of memory referred to as confidential, encrypted, or private
memory.

Fig. 1: Memory access by the CPU and by peripheral devices in CVMs
Fig. 1 illustrates memory access in CVMs by the CPU and by peripheral devices (also
known as input-output devices) such as GPUs (graphical processing units), NICs (network
interface cards), SSDs (solid-state drives), etc. The CPU, which in this context hosts the virtual
machine, uses an IOMMU (input-output memory management unit) to specify to a memory
controller the addresses from memory that the VM seeks. Data written to or read from the
memory by the CPU is encrypted (decrypted) by an encryption engine typically located within
the memory controller. When it comes to access of memory by a peripheral device, for various
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reasons, e.g., relating to the width of the bus between a peripheral and the memory, etc., the
physical address of a memory location can differ from the address used for that location by a
peripheral device. For example, a peripheral may use the input-output address (IOA) 0x1000 to
refer to the physical address (PA) location 0x5000. The IOMMU is a module that translates
addresses between the PA space and the input-output address (IOA) space.
For robust encryption, the ciphertext corresponding to a given plaintext depends not only
on the plaintext but also the physical address of the plaintext. A plaintext ‘ABC’ will map to one
ciphertext if ‘ABC’ were stored starting at physical address 0x5000 and to another, distinct,
ciphertext if ‘ABC’ were stored starting at a different physical address 0x5001. Thus, not only is
the hardware-rooted key required to encrypt plaintext (to decrypt ciphertext), but also the
physical address of the plaintext (ciphertext).
Since the confidential memory of the CVM uses the physical address of the data as a part
of the encrypt/decrypt function, the peripheral device needs a way to ascertain the physical
address for a piece of data being encrypted/decrypted. However, with the IOMMU, the
peripheral device knows not the physical address of the data but only its IO address. One way to
enable peripheral access to memory is to delineate a section of memory as unencrypted (also
known as shared memory, as opposed to private or confidential memory), and stipulate that
peripherals access only the unencrypted region of memory. Although such a scheme obviates
encryption-decryption and requires the peripheral to only know the IO address (not physical
address) of the data being accessed, the scheme leaves peripheral-memory communication open
to attacks. Also, the scheme can suffer from bottlenecks in data flow due to the relatively small
size of memory that can safely be left in plaintext.
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Currently, there is no way to transfer encrypted data of a CVM to a peripheral device
(e.g., GPU, NIC, SSD, etc.) without decrypting it with the hardware-rooted CVM private key, reencrypting it with a transport key that is distinct from the hardware-rooted key used in the
memory controller and sharing the transport key with the peripheral. Indeed, a PCI standard
protocol can be defined to add a peripheral device (e.g., GPU, NIC, SSD, etc.) to the trusted
compute base (TCB) of the CVM; establish a secure channel between the device and the CVM;
establish a transport key between the device and the CVM; and enable the device to access
encrypted CVM memory (e.g., via an enhanced IOMMU and DMA engine). In such a protocol, a
transport key encrypts/decrypts over the secure channel while a distinct, hardware-rooted CVM
private key encrypts/decrypts to the DRAM. However, to maintain confidentiality across the
secure channel, the protocol would require two encryption/decryption passes when a device
accesses CVM confidential memory, e.g., one pass to the CVM private key and a second pass to
the transport key, resulting in a substantial reduction in computing speed.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques to enable a peripheral device (e.g., GPU, NIC, SSD,
etc.) of a confidential virtual machine (CVM) to access the encrypted memory of the CVM
securely and efficiently using just one encryption/decryption pass. The techniques enable secure,
high-speed computing at low power consumption. The techniques account for address translation
between input-output address space and physical address space, such that a peripheral can
continue working in IOA space while encryption (decryption) can continue to depend on the
physical address of the plaintext (ciphertext) to be encrypted (decrypted). The techniques obviate
the use of compute-intensive keys such as transport keys subsidiary to the hardware-rooted keys
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used for CVM-memory communication.
The techniques operate in two phases - CVM setup and CVM operation.
CVM setup

Fig. 2: CVM setup phase
During CVM setup, the hardware-rooted CVM private key is securely shared with the
peripheral device. As illustrated in Fig. 2, this is done by first accepting the peripheral device
into the trusted compute base (TCB) of the CVM (202), establishing a secure channel between
the device and the CVM. Alongside the hardware-rooted CVM private key, the physical address
tweak, e.g., the IOA-PA offset and the procedure to incorporate the offset into encryption, is also
shared with the device (204). Since CVM encryption (decryption) depends on the physical
address of the plaintext (ciphertext), sharing the physical address tweak enables the peripheral to
access encrypted memory using DMA (direct memory access).
CVM operation at runtime
During CVM operation, the peripheral device accesses confidential memory using the
CVM private key shared during the setup phase, and, if the IOMMU is on, with IOA-PA address
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translation enabled by the IOMMU. CVM operation is described in greater detail below under
four cases, e.g., reading/writing with IOMMU on/off.
DMA-read with IOMMU

Fig. 3: A DMA-read by a peripheral device with the IOMMU on
As illustrated in Fig. 3, a DMA-read by a peripheral device with the IOMMU on takes
place as follows:
●

To read the private memory of the CVM via DMA, the device ❶ passes the starting IO

address (IOA) and the size (SZ) of memory to be read as parameters into the
DMA_READ API.
●

The IOMMU ❷ translates the IO address to a physical address.

●

The IOMMU ➌ signals the memory controller to read data from the CVM private

memory.
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●

The memory controller ➍ returns the encrypted data in the memory

(ENCRYPTED_DATA[SZ]) to the IOMMU.
●

The IOMMU ➎ returns a two-element tuple comprising PA and

ENCRYPTED_DATA[SZ].
●

The device ➏ decrypts the data using the private key and PA tweak obtained during the

setup phase and the physical address obtained from the IOMMU.
DMA-write with IOMMU

Fig. 4: A DMA-write by a peripheral device with the IOMMU on
As illustrated in Fig. 4, a DMA-write by a peripheral device with the IOMMU on takes
place as follows:
● The device ❶ requests from the IOMMU the physical address for the memory region

being written. This can be done via a zero-length read to the IO address being written.
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●

The IOMMU ❷ translates IO address (IOA) to a physical address.

● The IOMMU ➌ sends the PA to the device.

● The device ➍ encrypts the data (DATA) to be DMA-written using the private key and

PA tweak obtained during the setup phase and the PA obtained from the IOMMU.
● The device ➎ sends the encrypted data (ENCRYPTED_DATA) of the required size

(SZ) and starting IO address (IOA) to the IOMMU.
● The IOMMU ❷ translates the IO address to a physical address.

● The IOMMU ➏ writes the encrypted data to the CVM private memory.

DMA-read without IOMMU
If the IOMMU is not involved in memory access, then the device needs to know the
physical address of the region of memory to be accessed. The device DMA-reads the CVM
private memory as though it were written in plaintext (although it is not). The device decrypts
the data using the physical address along with the private key and the PA tweak obtained during
the setup phase.
DMA-write without IOMMU
If the IOMMU is not involved in memory access, then the device needs to know the
physical address of the region of memory to be accessed. The device encrypts the data using the
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physical address and the private key and PA tweak obtained during the setup phase. The
encrypted data is DMA-written over the PCI bus into the private memory of the CVM.
To forestall the possibility of a device outside of the TCB of the CVM impersonating a
device within the TCB, DMA-reads and the DMA-writes can be amended with cryptographic
signatures that can be used by the IOMMU or memory controller to authenticate the device.
For every new IO address, the device asks for IOA-to-PA translation and stores it in its
input/output translation lookaside buffer (IOTLB). Since translations are cached inside the
device IOTLB, IOMMU accesses are removed from the critical path. The device accesses
encrypted data directly from the memory controller.
Some CVM hardware uses error correcting code (ECC) bits (also known as integrity bits)
in the private memory of the CVM to ensure that the memory has not been maliciously or
accidentally overwritten. Peripheral devices typically don’t have direct access to these integrity
bits. Therefore, the memory controller can update the ECC bits during a DMA-write from a
device within the TCB of a CVM.
In this manner, the described techniques enable encrypted access from a peripheral to
confidential memory in a fast and power-efficient manner. The described techniques circumvent
the complexity of maintaining in software a transport key that is distinct from the hardwarerooted private key of the CVM.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to enable a peripheral device of a confidential virtual
machine to access encrypted memory using a single encryption pass. The techniques enable
secure, high-speed computing at low power consumption. Address translation between inputoutput and physical address spaces is accounted for such that peripherals continue to work in
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input-output address space while encryption continues to depend on the physical address of the
data. The techniques obviate compute-intensive transport keys subsidiary to hardware-rooted
virtual machine keys.
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